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Abstract
In this paper we develop a private-collective model of voluntary public knowl-
edge production, where group-based social preferences have an impact on coalition
formation. Our theoretical model builds on the large empirical literature on volun-
tary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including source code in commu-
nities of software developers or data provided to open access data repositories. Our
analysis shows under which conditions social preferences such as `group belonging'
or `peer approval' inﬂuence stable coalition size, as such rationalising several stylized
facts emerging from large scale surveys of Free/Libre/Open-Source software developers
(David and Shapiro, 2008), previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity
of social preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable, but mixed
coalitions.
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1 Introduction
A vast body of empirical research has shown the eﬀectiveness of voluntary mech-
anisms for the production of public knowledge goods.1 From the point of view of
public good theory, two important features of successful economic and institutional
arrangements are highlighted in this literature: ﬁrst, the importance of reaching an
adequate group size for the knowledge generation process to proceed and, second,
the eﬀect of private beneﬁts on the willingness of agents to participate to the public
knowledge production through coalitions.
The ﬁrst feature has been widely analyzed in empirical surveys of open source soft-
ware communities. For example in a recent large-scale survey, Schweik and English
(2012) have shown that reaching a certain group size is a condition for developers to
eﬀectively pool their eﬀorts and contributions. In other words, only if the aggregate
level of the produced public good is high enough -through attracting a suﬃcient num-
ber of contributors with appropriate expertise for selected tasks at hand- will agents
be motivated to voluntarily contribute to the development of a project. Indeed, in
a simulation model of large-scale open source software projects, Dalle and David
(2008) emphasize the importance of such sub-group diversity when characterising
the dynamics of actual projects.2
Further, when the minimal coalition size is reached, this size will theoretically
also be the equilibrium size. Since other agents can free ride on the public good
once it is produced, there is no economic incentive for them to join the contributors'
group. This duality between the core group of user-developers on the one hand and
the broader user group on the other, is a well-known pattern that is observed in open
source development projects as well (Raymond, 1999). Indeed, in these projects, the
group of users-developers grows until the group-size is suﬃcient for the task at hand,
while the broader group of software users continues to grow beyond that size. The
latter however does not imply that the core group of developers remains invariably
composed of the exact same people over time (Dalle and David, 2008).3
The second feature related to public good theory, which can also be illustrated
by examples from the empirical literature on open source development, is that vol-
untarily provided knowledge goods have a joint public/private character (Hippel and
Krogh, 2003). These goods generate both aggregate public and personal private ben-
eﬁts to the contributors, such as private problem solving, learning and enjoyment,
higher citations for researchers through increased visibility, or access to new personal
competencies by joining a group with high-level expertise. As a consequence, agents
1See e.g. Lessig (2001), Benkler (2006), Hess et al. (2008), or David (2008).
2Diﬀerent sub-groups, with diﬀerent motivations, are then attracted to diﬀerent sub-branches of
the tree-like process driving open source software development.
3Because of this `turnover' of developers, the core group is more accurately described as a `quasi-
stable' community of agents, which nonetheless always has the appropriate size to intervene in the
accessible parts of the code-base requiring further development.
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contributing to public knowledge pools are both driven by the public good beneﬁts
and the private beneﬁts generated by the production of that good. Evidence for this
mixed public/private character is given in many studies of public knowledge goods in
ﬁelds beyond the case of the software developers communities. One can think for ex-
ample of open access databases with tailor made data management tools that beneﬁt
speciﬁc communities and individuals (David, 2005), or hybrid funding arrangements
-including both market and non-market tools- for openly available culture products
on the internet (Lessig, 2008).
As has been shown elsewhere, this joint public/private character can have dif-
ferent eﬀects on contributions.4 One major issue however is not addressed in the
existing theoretical models: what is the role of private beneﬁts when group-related
social preferences aﬀect the willingness to join a coalition producing public knowl-
edge goods? Indeed, as shown by Dalle and David (2008) in the particular case of
open source development, reaching a `quasi-stable' stage of a community of contrib-
utors generating an evolving code-base, is best explained by the joint involvement
of several classes of participants with diﬀerent mixes of privately and socially moti-
vated agents. In three of these classes social preferences play an explicit role, where
developers are either driven by peer esteem (so-called `kudos' seekers), group related
learning opportunities (so-called social interaction seekers), or both. In other words,
when group approval or group belonging are important to agents, private beneﬁts of
knowledge production transcend the purely individual or altruistic divide studied in
earlier work,5 and also have a group-based dimension.
To study the role of such preferences in this context, we develop a theoretical
model of voluntary public knowledge production. To the best of our knowledge, we
are ﬁrst to investigate the eﬀect of group-based social preferences on the kind of
bargaining processes set to overcome social dilemmas. Our approach draws on the
private-collective incentive theory of Hippel and Krogh (2003), developed within the
wider context of `user based innovation'. We then complement this perspective by
building on the theory of group-related internal motivations, as well as the social
psychology literature analyzing social preferences, extra-role behaviour and organi-
zational citizenship behavior (LePine et al., 2002).
Our main ﬁnding is that the private beneﬁts of public knowledge production
can have contrasting eﬀects on coalition formation. First, and in line with earlier
work, private beneﬁts bring about smaller coalitions since the public beneﬁts of
knowledge are needed less to overcome its production costs. However, and especially
4If the private beneﬁt has a market substitute, the joint character can undermine the willingness
to contribute to the public good in situations where the market price of the substitute is suﬃciently
low (Cornes and Sandler, 1984). See also Andreoni (1988), Kotchen (2006, 2009) and Vicary (1997,
2000) for opposite eﬀects in the absence of market substitutes.
5See for example Gächter et al. (2010) and Garriga et al. (2012) for a discussion on the eﬀects
of inequality aversion, fairness and reciprocity in the private-collective context.
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when group approval is more important to developers than group belonging, larger
individual beneﬁts can lead to bigger coalitions as well. Because cooperation is
perceived as being based more on self-interest than on altruistic motives in this case,
knowledge production is considered less of an achievement by peers. Consequently,
larger public beneﬁts produced by a bigger coalition are needed to compensate for
these `reputational' losses.
In short, whether a coalition is made up out of developers deriving large direct
gains from knowledge production -such as the `hackers' discussed further on- or ex-
hibit social preferences for contributing to the group's social identity -such as the
`social learners' introduced below- makes a diﬀerence in terms of stable coalition
size. Also, as the group-based social preferences become more pronounced across the
board, joining the coalition simply becomes too alluring for non-members. Develop-
ers then rally around ever higher group-induced welfare levels, up to the point that
the grand coalition is the only stable coalition.
Lastly, we study a population composed of multiple developer types, each with
diﬀerent social preferences. We show that, in line with earlier ﬁndings by Dalle and
David (2008), smaller groups with homogeneous social preferences can overcome the
social dilemma by broadening their base. This results in larger, more heterogeneously
composed coalitions, made up out of diverse sub-groups.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic motivation of
our analysis and elaborates on the supporting literature. Section 3 theoretically
analyses how social dilemmas can be overcome through coalition formation in a
private-collective model, allowing for social preferences. In Section 4 we present
an application of the model assuming heterogeneous social preferences. Section 5
concludes.
2 Motivation
To fully grasp the scope of our theoretical model introduced below, we ﬁrst look at
the personal attributes and behavioral patterns of real-life software developers. This
to illustrate how the interplay of social preferences and private beneﬁts can inﬂuence
coalition formation.
2.1 The case of FLOSS developers
The FLOSS-US 2003 survey (David and Shapiro, 2008) is a web-based survey, gen-
erating a wealth of data on motivations and reasons for developers to begin to work
on Free/Libre, Open Source Software (FLOSS) projects. Using this data, David
and Shapiro (2008) classify the respondents according to their distinct motivational
proﬁles by hierarchical cluster analysis (see ﬁgure 1 in appendix C). In addition,
whenever possible, the respondents in each cluster are also matched to projects of
3
known membership sizes, revealing that the fractions of respondents from each mo-
tivational cluster for the large and the very small project ranges are diﬀerent (see
ﬁgure 2 in appendix C). Now, two major outcomes from this study cannot readily
be explained in a model without social preferences.
The ﬁrst point is related to the contrasting eﬀects of social preferences on coalition
formation, speciﬁcally in the case of low versus high direct private returns for the
members of the coalition. As can be seen from the study of David and Shapiro
(see ﬁgure 2 in appendix C), the three clusters where group-based social preferences
are at work - the `social learners', `social programmers' and `user/innovators'- are
present both in the small and large ranges of the project sizes. Stable coalitions
of the smaller and larger kind are thus equally spread, and this compared to other
clusters which are only present in the large ranges. This is consistent with the
intuition that group belonging and peer approval foster cooperation in situations of
social dilemma. In contrast, the cluster of `aspiring hackers', which is composed of
`[. . . ] individualist, materially motivated programmers, which take part to FLOSS
in the interest of a future career` (David and Shapiro, 2008), is more present in the
large-size groups than in the small-size groups. In such cases the willingness to join
a coalition arguably depends more on the purely individual, rather than the group-
based beneﬁts from knowledge production. The question remains why these aspiring
hackers participate more in the larger projects, whilst deriving sizeable career beneﬁts
from contributing. Indeed, the literature on coalition formation would in this case
predict the exact opposite outcome. Our model provides some intuition here.
The second point concerns the formation of heterogeneous coalitions to overcome
social dilemmas, when homogeneous groups are too small to form viable coalitions.
Figure 3 in appendix C gives the matrix for developers' movements among projects of
diﬀerent membership size. In reading these data, it is reasonable to assume that on
average developers in their ﬁrst project derive higher personal learning and problem
solving beneﬁts, i.e. higher direct private beneﬁts, compared to the involvement of
these same persons in their second and/or most recent project (David and Shapiro,
2008). As a result, and on average, developers in second stage projects show a higher
probability to go to larger FLOSS projects, where the individual marginal return on
the aggregate public good is likely to be higher.
In particular, this result is valid both for agents that were involved in the ﬁrst
stage in small groups, which are likely to be homogeneous, or in medium groups,
which include both homogeneous and heterogeneous cases. The ﬁrst case corresponds
to homogeneous groups that extend to heterogeneous groups to reach the stable
coalition size. The second case corresponds to the increase in optimum group size
for heterogeneous coalitions, where the private return component of the contribution
to the public good is also decreasing. So far, this interpretation coincides well with
the literature on coalition formation: smaller private beneﬁts imply larger coalitions.
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Nevertheless, a certain amount of developers continues to work on projects of equal,
er even smaller size as well. Also here, our model oﬀers an explanation, rationalising
the process of mixed coalition formation.
In short, our model will frame most of these -often seemingly contrasting- dy-
namics and pinpoint where the private beneﬁts of knowledge production and social
preferences interact. This to provide a fresh perspective on how coalitions take shape
in a private-collective setting.
2.2 Supporting literature
Whilst a large theoretical literature has studied endogenous coalition formation
among countries grappling with global environmental problems,6 we zoom in on vol-
untary contribution to public goods production.7 As pointed out earlier, and adding
to this latter perspective on coalition formation, we focus on a speciﬁc sub-category
of public goods: public knowledge goods. We consider a situation where software de-
velopers face a social dilemma so that, as is the standard initial position in any public
good game, their dominant strategy will be non-contribution to the production of the
knowledge good. The aim of the model is then to investigate how social preferences
inﬂuence the bargaining process, taking place to overcome this social dilemma.
To allow for social preferences, we draw on the private-collective incentive theory
developed by Hippel and Krogh (2003). In line with their extensive case study
research, we assume that `[. . . ] contributors to a public good can inherently obtain
private beneﬁts that are tied to the development of that good. These beneﬁts are
available only to project contributors and not to free riders and represent a form of
selective incentives for project participation that need not be managed by collective
action project personnel` (Hippel and Krogh, 2003).
This approach chimes well with the general theory of joint products proposed by
(Cornes and Sandler, 1984, 1994), and further developed by Kotchen (2006, 2009)
and Vicary (1997, 2000). One of the main contributions here, is that free-riding
over other agents' contribution to public goods decreases when these same goods also
provide contributors with private beneﬁts.8 Now, by introducing evidence from social
psychology on the role of group behavior, we extend the scope of these private beneﬁts
beyond the purely self-interested, materially tinged frontier. What is more, since
these beneﬁts are group-related, they will be conditional on coalition-membership.
6Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) or Barrett (1994) laid the groundworks here, followed
by e.g. Barrett (2003), Ulph (2004) or Kolstad (2007). Finus (2008) provides a survey of this large
body of literature.
7See e.g. Kosfeld et al. (2009) or McEvoy (2010).
8In Sandler and Arce (2007), such impure public good production is set in the context of in-
ternational development cooperation. Here, donor countries can also derive private beneﬁts -e.g.
through the sale of technology- in addition to the global public good beneﬁts related to the increase
in economic development and poverty alleviation. Finus and Rübbelke (2013) go on to study such
`ancillary beneﬁts' of public good provision in a setting of international environmental agreements.
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The literature in social psychology highlights two key dimensions of social pref-
erences that play a prominent role in group behavior: group identity related to the
collective goals realized by a group or community, and peer approval of pro-social
attitudes. First, studies provide compelling evidence that the longing for a positive
social group identity is a key determinant of engagement in group behavior. So-
cial psychological experiments have shown that social group identity is even in many
cases the most important explanatory factor to account for various types of group re-
lated motivations such as procedural justice, fairness and supervisor ratings (Blader
and Tyler, 2009; Wit and Kerr, 2002). The second type of social preference that
plays an important role in group engagement is the social approval for individual
pro-social attitudes and behavior (LePine et al., 2002). These individual pro-social
reputational eﬀects have also been studied extensively in the context of overcoming
social dilemmas (Suurmond et al., 2004; Bolton et al., 2005).
Especially the latter dimension is reminiscent of the social exchange approach
modelled by Holländer (1990), where voluntary cooperative behavior is assumed to
be motivated by social approval. This approval is conceptualized as an emotional
activity: emotions, feelings, but also verbal expressions are modelled as having a
stimulus power s(b), prompting emotional reactions that measure the subjective value
of cooperative behavior b. We will follow a similar approach in what follows, using
linear relationships for simplicity.
3 The model
Consider a community of n developers interacting in a common environment, po-
tentially pooling their eﬀorts to produce public knowledge goods qj . To model
the decision-making driving this process, we follow the approach pioneered by Hoel
(1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) or Barrett (1994), which comes down to mod-
elling two games under perfect and complete information. A `contribution' public
good game, where each developer decides how much to contribute to the public
knowledge good, is then preceded by a `metagame', deﬁning actual cooperation. In-
deed, by taking into account the behaviour of others, a developer may decide to team
up with colleagues in a coalition, or to go at it alone. Working backwards, we start




Depending on whether a coalition of smembers (s = |S|) is formed in the `metagame',





j qj − cqi + abqi if i /∈ S or if S = ∅
b
∑N
j qj − cqi + abqi + qi (β + (b− a)θ) if i ∈ S
(1)
where the public good character of the beneﬁts to knowledge production b
∑N
j qj
depends on total production
∑N
j qj , and the cost of production is given by c. The
purely individual, `ancillary' beneﬁts derived from knowledge production -such as pri-
vate problem solving, learning, increased visibility or access to expertise- are denoted
by a. We assume these are outweighed by the marginal public beneﬁt of producing
the knowledge good, such that b > a, and that they are enjoyed by all contribu-
tors. In other words, so far utility was the same for coalition members as well as
non-members.
Conversely, the group-related social beneﬁts we mentioned above, accrue only
to developers working together in a coalition. The sense of `belonging' to a larger
group striving to achieve the same goals, which we deﬁned above as contributing to
the group identity, is given by β. The degree to which fellow developers appreciate
individual contributions to this larger group, what we called pro-social reputation
building above, is marked by θ. The larger the divide between the public `social'
beneﬁt of production b and the purely individual beneﬁt a, the more an individual
contribution is perceived as an achievement by peers.
We are now ready to go over the possible outcomes of the game, given every pos-
sible strategic combination decided on in the `metagame' a priori. Assume ﬁrst that
all developers play simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The Nash equilibrium is
then derived by computing the ﬁxed point of developer's reaction functions, yielding
a payoﬀ vector ~uo. Instead, when developers decide to produce the knowledge good
by forming a coalition, we assume a bargaining process works towards the Pareto
optimal outcome. This process may result in a coalition of s members, where s goes
from 2 to n, in which case the grand coalition forms. The cooperative outcome of
this game is given by the Nash bargaining solution,9 with the non-cooperative pay-oﬀ
vector ~uo as the threat point.
Now, to model a social dilemma, we assume the social optimum where everyone
works together is diﬀerent from the non-cooperative equilibrium. Also, following
Finus and Rübbelke (2013), we normalize the strategy space to qi(0, 1) so that there
are essentially only two possible equilibrium strategies: `produce knowledge' (qi = 1)
or not (qi = 0). A suﬃcient condition for production to be an equilibrium choice in
9This assumption is not essential, any bargaining solution in the literature would deliver similar
results.
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= nb+ ab− c+ (β + (b− a)θ) > 0 (2)




= b+ ab− c < 0 (3)
arriving at the typical prisoner's dilemma outcome: production pays from a global,
social perspective but not from an individual one. The question then becomes
whether developers will choose to cooperate to overcome this social dilemma. We
investigate the stability of such a coalition in the next section.
3.2 Stability and proﬁtability of coalitions: the `metagame'
Each individual developer considers the possible choices (cooperative or non-cooperative)
of his counterparts, and his subsequent outcomes deﬁned in the contribution game. A
coalition of s members can then only form if production pays oﬀ, i.e. if the beneﬁts
of each contributing member uMi outmatch the payoﬀs under the non-cooperative
outcome given by ~uo. This kind of proﬁtability is guaranteed by
uMi = sb+ ab− c+ (β + (b− a)θ) ≥ u0 = 0 (4)
where, because of (3), non-cooperative developers set an equilibrium production
choice of qi = 0, and derive zero utility as a result.
Naturally, the fact that cooperative knowledge production is proﬁtable, is only
a minimum requirement for any coalition to form. The main issue undermining
coalition-formation is free-riding by non-producers. Here, developers have the incen-
tive to let others form the coalition but share in its produce, without contributing
themselves. A coalition will by consequence only form if it is both
Internally stable: uMi (s) ≥ uNMi (s− 1) ∀i ∈ S (5)
and
Externally stable: uNMi (s) > u
M
i (s+ 1) ∀i /∈ S (6)
where S again denotes the set of coalition members, and where we assume that if
a developer is indiﬀerent between joining the coalition or staying outside, she will
join. This notion of stability draws on the cartel stability literature, deﬁning a cartel
as stable when there are no incentives for any individual members to leave nor any
outsiders to join.10 In this sense, when a coalition s is internally stable, then coalition
10See e.g. Donsimoni et al. (1986) or d'Aspremont et al. (1983). Alternative notions of stability
leading to larger coalitions, such as `farsighted stability', are considered by Osmani and Tol (2009).
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s− 1 is externally instable as outsiders will want to join. On the other hand, if that
same coalition s is externally stable, then coalition s+ 1 will be internally unstable
since coalition members will want to leave.
Employing the notion of stability given by (5) and (6), we verify whether a coali-
tion formed in our setup would be stable. Doing so, we ﬁrst assume that group-based
beneﬁts are never suﬃciently large to overturn (3):
Assumption 1 The group-based beneﬁts to public knowledge production are such
that
b+ ab− c+ (β + (b− a)θ) < 0 (7)
Which realistically implies that social preferences are less pronounced than the indi-
vidual preferences for the knowledge good itself, expressed by the public and private
beneﬁts of production, a and b respectively. What happens when this assumption
fails is captured by proposition 1 below, which also summarises our main stability
result:11
Proposition 1 If the social beneﬁts of cooperating in group are not too pronounced,














If group-based beneﬁts are larger, so that b + ab − c + (β + (b− a)θ) ≥ 0, the grand
coalition forms.
In other words, when social preferences are less pronounced than the preference
for the knowledge good itself -as well as for the private beneﬁts a deriving from it-
a stable coalition of size s∗ < n forms. In this case, proposition 1 predicts that
higher public beneﬁts of public knowledge measured in terms of costs of production
b
c (= γ), lead to smaller coalition sizes. Because of the widening gap between beneﬁts
and costs, less developers are needed to make cooperative production proﬁtable. A
standard result in the literature.
Contrary to a model omitting social preferences however, the eﬀect of the private
beneﬁt a is ambiguous here. On the one hand, individual beneﬁts bring about smaller
coalitions since public beneﬁts of knowledge b are needed less to overcome its pro-
duction costs. On the other hand, and especially when group approval of individual
achievements is important compared to group belonging, larger private gains lead to
larger coalitions. Here then, since cooperation is perceived as being based more on
self-interest than on altruistic motives, the individual gain undercuts the extent to
which knowledge production is considered by peers as a social achievement. Public
11A thorough proof of the proposition is given in appendix A.
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beneﬁts will in this latter case be more imperative to developer welfare, resulting in
larger coalitions.
In other words, if developers incur considerable individual gains from public
knowledge production, but ﬁnd peer approval to be important, our model predicts
larger coalitions. This coincides with the larger presence of the `aspiring hackers' in
the bigger projects of the FLOSS data described earlier (see ﬁgure 2 in appendix C),
since hackers in general are considered to have a lot to gain individually, but care
less for group belonging or identity (David and Shapiro, 2008). Conversely, when
coalition members exhibit strong social preferences favouring group identity build-
ing, such as the social programmers or learners in the FLOSS database, larger as
well as smaller coalitions may form.
Lastly, when group based preferences are large enough to switch around condi-
tion (3), joining the coalition simply becomes too alluring for all non-members. The
coalition size is maximised, which logically has developers rally around ever higher
group-induced welfare levels. This process continues up to the point the grand coali-
tion forms, and s∗ = n.
4 Heterogeneous Social Preferences
When group-based preferences are such that assumption 1 holds, the stable coalition
size s∗ < n described above may not be reached for sheer lack of numbers. In
this case, the question becomes whether a larger, yet inevitably more heterogeneous
coalition could overcome the social dilemma instead.
Studying the FLOSS survey data given in ﬁgure 3 in appendix C, such a process
may indeed be taking place. Engaged in their ﬁrst projects, groups are often smaller
and more homogeneous as well as enjoying larger direct private beneﬁts a, since the
learning curve is steepest at this point. Follow-up projects on the other hand mostly
expand in size, suggesting that lower private beneﬁts are compensated by forming
larger coalitions. However, and importantly, such larger groups have in all likelihood
also gained in diversity and heterogeneity. To study these dynamics, we introduce
a heterogeneous community in what follows, where developers can diﬀer in terms of
their preferences for group belonging β, as well as reputation building θ.
Suppose ﬁrst a coalition of s members forms for a start-up project, out of a
community of n identical developers. Suppose also that assumption 1 holds, in
which case s = s∗ < n. Then assume that, by moving from the ﬁrst to the next
projects, private beneﬁts a are pushed down considerably. Now, whether this will
have our coalition break up because its required size expressed by proposition 1 is
larger than the community size itself, also depends on the mix of social preferences.
If developers are highly sensitive to peer appreciation so that θ >> β, we learn from
proposition 1 that this mitigates the increase in required coalition size s∗. Producing
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public knowledge is in this case valued as more of a social achievement by peers, so
smaller coalitions are needed. This would explain why there are indeed groups in the
FLOSS database which more or less stick to their initial size in follow-up projects.
Contrarily, if group belonging and identity reign supreme so that θ << β, the
required coalition size is more likely to exceed the community's size as private beneﬁts
a edge down in follow-up projects, resulting in a situation where s∗ > n. But
does this mean all further cooperation is ruled out? The FLOSS data point in
the opposite direction, as cooperation in general takes on larger forms in larger
coalitions for follow-up projects. Indeed, other communities may join the ranks of
our ﬁrst community, which would come out reinforced as a result. The only remaining
question is then whether such heterogeneous, merged communities can support stable
coalitions.
Assume a ﬁrst community of n developers has strong social preferences for group
belonging and identity β, but draws less satisfaction from peer eﬀects θ. Applying
(5), internal stability is then established if for each member of the coalition we have
uM1i (s) = sb+ ab− c+
(
β + (b− a)θ) ≥ 0 = uNM1i (s− 1) (9)
Now consider a second community which, for simplicity's sake, has exactly the op-
posite preferences as the ﬁrst. Internal stability here requires
uM2i (s) = sb+ ab− c+
(
β + (b− a)θ) ≥ 0 = uNM2i (s− 1) (10)
Following proposition 1, both (9) and (10) implicitly deﬁne the stable coalition size
for each community respectively. We assume these are such that s∗ > n and s∗ > n,
which reﬂects a considerable decrease of private beneﬁts a after a start-up project.
Since lower preferences for peer appreciation and higher preferences for group be-
longing bring about larger coalitions as private beneﬁts a drop, we also have that
s∗ > s∗. Suppose now both communities decide to merge for a follow-up project, so
that n = n+ n. The stable coalition would then be characterised by
s∗ =
c− ab− (β + (b− a)θ)
b
(11)
if, of course, s∗ < n + n. Logically, s∗ yields an internally as well as externally
stable coalition for the community counting n developers, as deﬁned by (9). For the
other community on the other hand, a smaller coalition size s∗ given by (10), would
already have ensured stability. However, in our merged setting a coalition of size s∗
is internally stable for this second community as well, since for all coalition members
of this community we have that
uM2i (s
∗) = sb+ ab− c+ (β + (b− a)θ) ≥ 0 = uNM2i (s∗ − 1) (12)
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where the last equality, uNM2i (s
∗ − 1) = 0 holds for the simple reason that at size
(s∗ − 1), coalition members hailing from our ﬁrst community with n developers
will defect without exception. Under perfect information, the n developers of the
other community take this potential breakdown of cooperation into account, and act
accordingly by contributing. Lastly, because s∗ > s∗, the coalition characterised by
(11) will also be externally stable with respect to developers of this second community.
We generalise these ﬁndings in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Let s∗ and s∗ be the stable coalition sizes emerging from two commu-
nities of developers, which are diﬀerent in terms of social preferences so that s∗ > s∗.
Furthermore, assume both communities are insuﬃciently large for the coalitions to
form separately, so that s∗ > n and s∗ > n. The merged community n = n+ n then
gives rise to:
1. A stable coalition of size s∗, if n ≥ s∗
2. Non-cooperation if n < s∗
To put our ﬁndings in more general terms, proposition 2 predicts that mixed coali-
tions of heterogeneous agents will be stable, even when smaller, more homogeneous
coalitions fail to form. Consequently, smaller groups with homogeneous preferences
can overcome the social dilemma by broadening their base, resulting in larger coali-
tions made up out of diverse sub-groups.
Lastly, we show in appendix how proposition 2 carries over to a setting where
assumption 1 does not hold, in which case we would start oﬀ with grand coalitions.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the ambiguity of private beneﬁts in fostering coalition for-
mation with publicly available knowledge goods. Such private beneﬁts tied to public
goods are considered as an important driver for the proliferation of pooled knowl-
edge goods in social networks. Private beneﬁts to contributors that have been widely
studied in the literature are of two kinds: (1) direct private beneﬁts such as individ-
ual problem solving or higher citation rates for researchers; (2) satisfaction of social
preferences such as group belonging, group identity, pro-social individual reputation
and status.
In the current literature on coalition formation for public good provision, the
eﬀect of these two kinds of private beneﬁts tied in knowledge production is mostly
considered to bring about smaller, stable coalition sizes. No theoretical explanation
of the ambiguous eﬀects of private beneﬁts for contributors to public good -that
is, in some cases, the private beneﬁts lead to smaller coalitions and in some cases
to larger ones- is provided in the literature. To build a more general model, this
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paper integrated the theory of public goods and a social psychological model of group
related social preferences into coalition theory. This allowed us to show the contrasted
eﬀects of social group identity and social approval/disapproval of individual pro-social
attitudes on the coalition formation. The presence of agents giving high value to their
individual pro-social reputation within a social network can make larger coalitions
necessary in order to keep coalition formation stable.
Even though the results of the analysis apply to a broad set of voluntary pooled
public knowledge goods, we applied the analysis to one of the most well studied and
prominent case of voluntary pooling of public knowledge goods, which is the case
of open source software. This comparison shows that the integration of social psy-
chology in public good theory is relevant for understanding community formation
behavior in this ﬁeld. In addition, the model predicts that mixed coalitions of het-
erogeneous agents can be stable even when smaller, more homogeneous coalitions fail
to form. However, additional empirical research is needed to further corroborate this
ﬁnding.
A Proof of proposition 1
First, suppose one coalition member leaves a coalition of s members formed in our
setup, and that the (s − 1) members continue to produce because uMi (s − 1) =
(s− 1) b + ab − c + (β + (b− a)θ) ≥ 0 so that the free-rider receives a payoﬀ of
uNMi (s− 1) = (s− 1) b. Now, as deﬁned in (5), internal stability requires
uMi (s) = nb+ ab− c+ (β + (b− a)θ) ≥ (n− 1) b = uNMi (s− 1) (13)
which boils down to
uMi (s) = b+ ab− c+ (β + (b− a)θ) ≥ 0 (14)
and which we have ruled out under assumption 1.
We can then move on to the second case, where the (s − 1) remaining members
cease production once the free-rider leaves because uMi (s− 1) = (s− 1) b+ ab− c+
(β + (b− a)θ) < 0 , with uNMi (s− 1) = 0 as a result. Internal stability now requires
that
uMi (s) = sb+ ab− c+ (β + (b− a)θ) ≥ 0 = uNMi (s− 1) (15)
which holds by our initial condition of proﬁtability (4), in eﬀect rendering cooperation
proﬁtable in the ﬁrst place. As a result, it is this second case which characterises an
internally stable coalition. Setting s = s∗ in (15) and re-working , internal stability
thus implies
s∗ ≥ c− ab− (β + (b− a)θ)
b











. For any s > s∗, members would continue to produce after
one member left the coalition, which cannot be an equilibrium as argued above.
Contrarily, when s < s∗, members would not produce at all since production is not
proﬁtable, so no coalition would form.
Now, in order for the same coalition to be externally stable, (6) has to apply so
that
uMi (s+ 1) = (s+ 1)b+ ab− c+ (β + (b− a)θ) < sb = uNMi (s) (17)
where the case of an internally stable coalition of (s+1) forming initially is again ruled
out because of (7). Re-writing (17) furthermore, we arrive at the initial condition
given by (7). Consequently, and re-working (16), the stable break-even point of













where we write the marginal public beneﬁt b of knowledge production in terms of
costs of production bc (= γ).
Suppose now that social preferences are so pronounced that assumption 1 is no
longer valid. In this case, internal stability is still guaranteed for every possible
coalition s ≤ n , as (14) would hold across the board. External stability on the other
hand, would be violated for every but one coalition: the grand coalition. Indeed,
(17) breaks down at every coalition size s < n in this case, as more and more non-
members would want to join the coalition and enjoy the group-based beneﬁts. This
process continues until every single developer has joined the coalition. 
B Continued proof of proposition 2: grand coali-
tions
Suppose now assumption 1 does not hold for both communities, because of very
pronounced group-based social preferences. We then get
b+ ab− c+ (β + (b− a)θ) ≥ 0 (19)
In this case s∗ = n and s∗ = n, and the only stable coalitions would be the grand
coalitions. Any diﬀerence between the heterogeneous communities at this point,
would derive strictly from diﬀerences in community size.
As soon as private beneﬁts a decrease after the ﬁrst start-up projects however,
(19) could tilt the other way. In this case, the stable coalition size will no longer be
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equal to the community size, and the question becomes whether
s∗ ≶ n and s∗ ≶ n (20)
If the required coalition size for follow-up projects exceeds the community size in
both cases, which is the premise for proposition 2, we are back in the situation
we described before. Of course, in the opposite case coalition sizes would actually
shrink in follow-up projects. This would then rationalise the remaining follow-up
ﬂows coming out of the FLOSS data. 
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C Figures: the case of FLOSS developers
Figure 1: Key characteristics of motivational clusters
Source: David and Shapiro, 2008, p. 384.
Figure 2: Distribution of small and large project participants by motivation proﬁles
identiﬁed by cluster analysis of FLOSS-US survey respondent
Source: David and Shapiro, 2008, p. 394.
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Figure 3: Transition matrix for developers' movements among projects of diﬀerent
membership sizes
Source: David and Shapiro, 2008, p. 389.
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